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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
Subjectivity in Employee Performance Ratings and Promotion Decisions:  
The Analysis of Job Levels  
 
By 
 
Jong-Yu Hao 
 
Doctor of Philosophy in Management 
 
 University of California, Irvine, 2016 
 
Professor Joanna Ho, Chair 
 
 
 
In this study, I examine how the use of subjectivity in performance evaluation and incentive 
design differs across job levels. Using a proprietary dataset from a major car dealership in 
Taiwan and focusing on lower-level employees, I find that the association between overall 
performance ratings and objective performance measures is lower when employees hold 
supervisory positions. Furthermore, for employees holding supervisory positions, promotions 
depend more on subjective evaluations and less on objective performance measures. Lastly, 
employees who are promoted tend to perform well and receive higher overall performance 
ratings in the future. Taken together, the evidence suggests that promotion decisions not only 
reward an employee’s past performance, but also reflect her supervisor’s expectation about 
future performance. This study contributes to the literature by investigating the use of 
subjectivity for lower-rank employees, and also complements our knowledge on the use of 
subjectivity across different job levels.  
 
 
 
1 
 
 “Not everything that counts can be counted, and not everything that can be counted counts.” 
Albert Einstein 
 
1. Introduction 
For the majority of organizations, it is hard to capture an individual employee’s contribution 
to firm value using only objective measures, because some job requirements cannot be quantified. 
As reported by the Bureau of National Affairs, contingent pay systems that involve subjective 
measures are more common than those involving objective measures.
1
 Despite the prevalent use 
of subjectivity in practice, there is scant empirical research on subjective performance measures 
in accounting literature. This leads Oyer and Schaefer (2010) to conclude that: “There is a great 
need for more empirical research on the use of implicit contracts and subjective performance 
evaluation in employment relationships.” In this study, I examine how firms use subjectivity in 
performance evaluation and incentive design for lower-level employees who represent the 
majority of an organization’s workers. 
The accounting literature has predominately investigated the use of subjectivity for mid-level 
managers and executives in performance evaluation and compensation design (Gibbs 1995; 
Hayes and Schaefer 2000; Höppe and Moers 2011). The use of subjectivity is conceivable at 
higher job levels because most of these job responsibilities are non-quantifiable. However, there 
is very limited evidence regarding whether or not subjectivity is at all used for lower-level 
employees who are also important to firm performance with contributions in areas such as 
corporate innovation (Chang et al. 2015).
2
 Second, even if subjectivity is used for lower-level 
employees, whether its use varies by job level has not been examined. For example, Merchant et 
al. (2010) argue that the relative informativeness of objective and subjective measures may differ 
                                                          
1
 The Bureau of National Affairs (1981) was cited by Kahn and Sherer (1990). 
2
 Chang et al. (2015) document the effect of employee stock options for rank-and-file employees on corporate 
innovation.   
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across job levels. However, they focus only on employees at similar job levels (i.e., higher-
ranking managers) and call for more research in this area. This study aims to fill this void by 
examining whether the use of subjectivity in performance evaluation and promotion decisions 
varies across job levels for lower-level employees. Furthermore, the study also examines how 
promotion decisions, which are a function of different performance measures, predict the future 
performance of the employees. 
Subjectivity can be in the form of individual performance ratings that supervisors are 
required to provide for their subordinates based on the expectations of what their jobs require.  In 
practice, a lot of organizations, such as Hewlett-Packard and American Express, adopt 
performance ratings to evaluate the overall performance of their employees.3 Consistent with the 
anecdotes, prior studies also document the prevalent use of such individual performance ratings 
in different organizations (Baker et al. 1994; Gibbs and Hendricks 2004; Dohmen 2004; Dohmen 
et al. 2004; Flabbi and Ichino 2001; Frederiksen and Takáts 2009; Frederiksen 2010). In this 
study, I focus on the use of ratings to measure an employee’s overall performance and examine 
my research questions in the context of a car dealership in Taiwan. In this car dealership, the 
branch managers subjectively determine overall performance ratings, and the major and most 
important objective performance measure in the performance appraisal process is the number of 
cars sold. I therefore separate overall performance ratings into objective performance, which is 
the number of cars sold, and subjective evaluations. I infer the subjective evaluations by 
subtracting the predicted overall performance ratings, which are based on the objective 
performance and other control variables, from the actual overall performance ratings.  
                                                          
3
 The performance appraisal system at Hewlett-Packard can be found on the website: 
http://ivythesis.typepad.com/term_paper_topics/2010/07/performance-appraisal-system-at-hewlett-packard.html; the 
example of American Express can be found in Kulik and Perry (2004). 
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Based on the maintained assumption that job responsibilities differ across job levels, the 
responsibilities of employees who supervise people are more likely to have non-quantifiable 
aspects than the responsibilities of those who do not supervise others. Therefore, objective 
performance measures for employees at higher job levels reveal less about overall performance, 
and subjective evaluations become more important (Merchant et al. 2010). In my study, I 
measure differences in job responsibilities by whether or not an employee is in a supervisory 
position. Accordingly, I expect the association between overall performance ratings and 
objective performance measures to be lower for employees holding supervisory positions.  
 Overall performance ratings, as a result of performance evaluation, might also be related to 
promotions. Promotions serve two functions: incentive provision and sorting (Baker et al. 1988). 
Incentive provision is achieved when promotions reward past performance with increased pay 
and rank in the organization. Gibbs (1995) suggests that promotions are associated with 
individual performance ratings in the current position. If individual performance ratings are 
influenced by objective performance measures and subjective evaluations differently across job 
levels, I also expect the extent to which promotions rely on different performance measures to 
vary across job levels. Furthermore, if promotion decisions provide incentives by rewarding past 
performance, how do they predict the future performance of the employees? In addition to the 
incentive provision, promotions sort employees into the jobs where their abilities are best suited. 
Therefore, promotions might also reflect the supervisors’ expectations about an employee’s 
future performance. In this case, I expect employees who are promoted will also be more likely 
to receive higher overall performance ratings in the future. 
I empirically test my hypotheses using a proprietary dataset from a major car dealership in 
Taiwan. The car dealership has 2,578 employees and 87 sales branches over six geographical 
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areas and was ranked number two in the Taiwanese automobile market in 2008. Due to the 
availability of employees’ overall performance ratings, the sample period covers the years from 
2001 to 2008. 4  I focus on employees working in the sales branches, because objective 
performance measures (i.e., the number of cars sold), which are necessary for the inference of 
subjective evaluations, are available only in these branches. I do not include branch managers 
and employees working in administration and support services, given that objective performance 
measures for evaluating these workers’ overall performance may be either unavailable or 
different from the sales employees. Differences in job responsibilities are defined as whether the 
position is a supervisory position, given that expectations of job demands are distinct between 
supervisory and nonsupervisory positions. To reduce the impact of outliers, I winsorize all 
continuous variables at the 1 percent tails. Additionally, standard errors are clustered at the 
employee level.  
I find that the association between overall performance ratings and objective performance 
measures is lower for employees in supervisory positions, consistent with the evidence that 
objective performance measures are less informative about an employee’s overall performance if 
she holds a supervisory position. Second, for employees in supervisory positions, the association 
between subjective evaluations and promotions is higher, while the association between 
objective performance measures and promotions is lower. The findings suggest that, in 
promotion decisions, the importance of different performance measures in current positions 
varies across job levels. Lastly, employees who are promoted in the current period tend to 
receive higher overall performance ratings in the future, consistent with the evidence that 
promotion decisions also reflect supervisors’ expectations about their subordinates’ future 
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 In this study, I use the same dataset as in Ghosh et al. (2012). The car dealership is not able to provide more 
information beyond the year of 2008. 
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performance (Gibbs 1995). Taken together, the findings suggest that promotion decisions not 
only reward an employee’s past performance, but also reflect her supervisor’s expectations about 
future performance.  
In addition to the main findings, I run three additional analyses. First, I redefine promotions 
by whether there is a change in job responsibilities upon promotion, because subjective 
assessments of ability may be more important when there is greater change in the job 
requirements (Grabner and Moers 2013). I find that the weight of subjective evaluations for 
promotions that move employees from nonsupervisory to supervisory positions is not only 
greater than that of promotions that keep employees within nonsupervisory positions, but also 
smaller than that of promotions that keep employees within supervisory positions. While the 
importance of subjective evaluations increases in the promotions from nonsupervisory to 
supervisory positions, this importance does not outweigh the importance of objective 
performance measures. Second, I examine the effectiveness of promotion-based incentives by 
investigating employee behaviors when promotion opportunities are high. I find that, when the 
probability of being promoted is high, employees in supervisory positions are more likely to 
perform better on subjective evaluations, although they do not neglect the importance of 
objective performance measures. Lastly, I rerun the analyses with redefined differences in job 
responsibilities, on a scale from one to six, in order to reevaluate my findings. My results remain 
qualitatively similar.  
My study has managerial implications and contributes to the accounting literature in the 
following ways. First, I am able to extend prior findings and provide evidence on the use of 
subjectivity for employees working at lower hierarchical levels of an organization. Prior studies 
document the extensive use of subjectivity in performance evaluation and incentive design for 
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mid-level managers and executives (Gibbs 1995; Hayes and Schaefer 2000; Höppe and Moers 
2011); however, few studies focus on lower-level employees who represent the majority of an 
organization’s workforce. In my study, both supervisory and nonsupervisory employees are 
lower-level employees. One interesting question is whether subjectivity is at all used, given that 
it is difficult to motivate self-interested supervisors to devote a large amount of resources 
necessary for performance evaluation, especially when the cost of inaccurate assessments is low. 
In this case, inaccurate assessments are likely to arise when supervisors largely rely on objective 
performance measures due to fewer conflicts and justifications required. My study provides 
empirical evidence and demonstrates the use of subjectivity even at the lower hierarchical levels 
of an organization. 
Second, my study extends the literature by investigating the use of subjectivity across job 
levels. Merchant et al. (2010) examine higher-ranking managers and find the correlations 
between objective and subjective performance ratings to be particularly low. They suggest that 
the objective measures might be less informative of overall performance at higher organizational 
levels, and call for more research in this area. In this study, I fill the void and show that a lower 
correlation between objective performance measures and employees’ overall performance ratings 
can be attributed to the fact that objective performance measures are less informative about these 
employees’ job requirements. When the employees’ job responsibilities are more quantifiable 
(i.e., nonsupervisory positions), objective performance measures can capture overall 
performance well, and hence the association between objective performance measures and 
overall performance ratings is higher. 
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The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I review prior literature and 
form my hypotheses. Section 3 describes my research setting and measurements. Section 4 
presents the test design and reports empirical results. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Literature review and hypotheses 
2.1. Subjectivity in performance evaluation and compensation 
 Economic-based agency models focus on the role of performance measures in aligning the 
objective of the principal and that of the agent (Holmstrom 1979; Banker and Datar 1989; 
Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991). A compensation contract should include any measure that 
carries incremental information on the agent’s actions. Furthermore, the relative weight placed 
on an individual measure should be a function of the measure’s signal-to-noise value, as 
reflected in its sensitivity (i.e., the change in its mean value in response to a change in the agent’s 
action) and precision (i.e., the inverse of the variance in the measure given the agent’s action) 
(Ittner et al. 2003).   
 Although many of these models say little about the specific types of performance measures 
that should be included in compensation contracts, several studies extend these papers to 
investigate the inclusion of subjectivity. Subjectivity entails judgments based on personal 
impressions, feelings, and opinions rather than on external facts. Hence, the correctness of a 
subjective assessment cannot be determined by a third party (Bol 2008). Prior studies examine 
the advantages of subjective measures and discretionary adjustments in performance evaluation 
and compensation design, and identify conditions under which the use of subjectivity would 
most likely be observed (e.g., Baker et al. 1994). Consistent with the theoretical predictions, the 
empirical findings suggest that subjectivity provides incremental information when the 
traditional financial measures are noisy (Murphy and Oyer 2000; Bushman et al. 1996; Hayes 
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and Schaefer 2000) or when the perceived weakness of quantitative performance measures is 
high (Gibbs et al. 2004; Woods 2012). 
 While the informativeness of subjectivity is associated with characteristics of the 
accompanying objective performance measures, the signal-to-noise value of subjective 
evaluations is also likely to vary with job levels (Merchant et al. 2010; Frederiksen et al. 2012).5 
At low levels of the firm, objective performance measures can be good indicators of an 
individual employee’s performance, because her job responsibility is more quantifiable. In the 
sales branch of the car dealership setting, for example, employees in nonsupervisory positions 
are mainly responsible for selling cars, and the number of cars sold can generally capture their 
overall performance. In contrast, subjective evaluations provide limited incremental information 
about these employees’ performance. Consequently, a supervisor may rely more on objective 
performance measures when evaluating the overall performance of her subordinates in 
nonsupervisory positions. 
 On the other hand, job responsibilities at higher levels of the firm are less likely to be 
quantified, and using objective measures alone cannot be effective (Merchant et al. 2010). For 
example, in the sales branch of the car dealership, employees working in supervisory positions 
are not only responsible for selling cars, but also are required to have strong leadership and team 
coordination. In this case, subjective evaluations are more informative because they capture 
employees’ non-quantifiable skills and performance more effectively than objective performance 
measures do. Therefore, a supervisor may rely more on subjective evaluations and less on 
objective performance measures when providing overall performance ratings for her 
subordinates holding supervisory positions. In other words, the association between overall 
                                                          
5
 For example, Frederiksen et al. (2012) find that controlling for job levels attenuates the effect of experience on 
performance ratings by one-third to one-half. 
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performance ratings and objective performance measures will be weaker for employees in 
supervisory positions.  
 While the signaling perspective of performance measures suggests that the choice of 
performance measures in performance evaluation is based on the relative informativeness of 
different measures, it is important to take into account that subjective measures are also noisier 
(i.e., less precise compared to objective measures), because different supervisors are likely to 
form different opinions given an agent’s action. The lower precision of subjectivity may reduce 
its attractiveness and discourage supervisors from using it in performance measurement.  
Furthermore, the incentive to use subjectivity may be even weaker for lower-level employees. 
It is difficult to motivate self-interested supervisors to devote the large amount of resources 
necessary for performance evaluation, especially when the cost of inaccurate assessments is low 
(Baker et al. 1988). At lower organizational levels of the firm, the cost of making inaccurate 
assessments is lower, because bonus allocation or pay increment as a result of performance 
evaluation is much lower than that for mid-level managers and executives. In this case, 
inaccurate assessments are likely to happen. In particular, supervisors are more likely to rely on 
objective performance measures because these measures generate fewer conflicts and supervisors 
do not have to justify their personal assessments of performance, especially for employees who 
perform poorly (Ahn et al. 2010). Accordingly, objective performance measures might be 
preferred over subjective evaluations for employees in both positions. In the end, whether the 
association between overall performance ratings and objective performance measures differs 
across job positions for lower-level employees is an empirical question. Based on the signaling 
perspective of performance measures, my first hypothesis is stated as follows:  
10 
 
H1: The association between overall performance ratings and objective performance 
measures is lower for employees holding supervisory positions than for those holding 
nonsupervisory positions. 
2.2. Subjectivity in promotion decisions  
While prior accounting research on subjectivity in incentive compensation largely focuses on 
relatively short-term bonus-based compensation contracts (Ittner et al. 1997; Ittner et al. 2003; 
Gibbs et al. 2004), most of the increases in an individual employee’s compensation can be traced 
to promotions rather than to continued services in a particular position (Baker et al. 1988; Gibbs 
1995).6  Despite the documented incentives associated with promotions within organizations, 
there has been little research on the role of subjectivity in promotion decisions.  
Promotions in organizations serve two important functions: the provision of incentives and 
sorting (Gibbs 1995). Promotions are used as the primary incentive device in most organizations, 
and they provide incentives by rewarding past performance with increased pay and rank (Baker 
et al. 1988). For example, Cichello et al. (2009) find that promotion decisions of division 
managers are associated with past accounting performance (i.e., ROA). In addition, promotion 
decisions share features similar to performance evaluations and may rely on a combination of 
objective and subjective performance measures. Campbell (2008) reports that promotion 
decisions are sensitive to nonfinancial performance measures, such as service quality and 
employee retention, after controlling for financial performance. Moreover, the incentives 
provided by promotions are also likely to vary with job levels. For example, Krishnan et al. 
(2013) suggest that promotions provide incentives to a greater extent for junior auditors. While 
they highlight the importance of performance ratings subjectively assessed by supervisors, I 
                                                          
6
 For example, Murphy (1985) finds that corporate vice presidents receive an average pay increase of 18.8 percent 
upon promotion to another vice-presidential or higher position, compared to an average pay increase of only 3.3 
percent in years when they remain in the same position. 
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extend this line of research by separating overall performance ratings into objective performance 
measures and subjective evaluations.7 
Focusing on the incentive provision function of promotions, the choice of performance 
measures in promotions is likely to depend on the relative informativeness of these measures 
about an employee’s effort (Holmstrom 1979). As discussed earlier, I posit that subjective 
evaluations are more important in evaluating the overall performance of employees in 
supervisory positions, while objective performance measures are more informative in evaluating 
the overall performance of employees in nonsupervisory positions. Accordingly, I predict that, 
for employees in supervisory positions, promotion decisions are likely to depend more on 
subjective evaluations and less on objective performance measures.  
H2: For employees holding supervisory positions, promotion decisions depend more on 
subjective evaluations and less on objective performance measures than promotion decisions 
for employees holding nonsupervisory positions. 
2.3. Promotion decisions and future performance 
If the choice of performance measures in promotion decisions depends on the relative 
informativeness about current performance, the next question is whether these decisions predict 
the future performance of employees. In other words, do employees who are promoted perform 
well after promotions? 
Other than incentive provision, promotions also serve a sorting function when they sort 
employees into the jobs for which employees’ skills and abilities are best suited. In this case, 
promotion decisions not only reward an employee’s past performance, but also reflect her 
                                                          
7
 In Krishnan et al. (2013), supervisors subjectively assess the performance of their subordinates across four 
dimensions: planning, execution, communication, and technical development (or workforce development). 
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supervisor’s expectations about her future performance (Gibbs 1995).8 For instance, Grabner and 
Moers (2013) find that the weight on current job performance decreases, while the weight on 
subjective assessments of ability increases in promotion decisions involving a change in job 
scope. Their findings suggest that when there are significant changes in job responsibilities upon 
promotion, supervisors take into account the subjective assessments of ability that can better 
predict future performance.  
In this study, I have an individual employee identifier that would allow me to track individual 
employee performance after promotions. Hence, focusing on the sorting function of promotions, 
promotion decisions should also reflect supervisors’ expectations about the future performance 
of an employee. That is, employees who are promoted are more likely to receive higher overall 
performance ratings in the future. Accordingly, hypothesis 3 is stated as follows:  
H3: Employees who are promoted are more likely to receive higher overall performance 
ratings in the future than those who are not promoted.  
3. Research setting and measures 
3.1. Research site 
The research site is a major car dealership in Taiwan (hereafter the research company), which 
has a domestic automobile market of nearly 383,000 car sales per year. The car dealership was 
ranked number two in 2008 with a market share of 36.5 percent.9 In addition, the car dealership 
had 2,578 employees and 87 sales branches over six geographical areas. The car dealership has 
two different types of business: car sales and car services. The sales branches are in charge of 
                                                          
8
 Gibbs (1995) uses the short-term reward earned on promotion to examine sorting function of promotions. The 
rationale is that if promotion sorts on ability, then measures of ability should predict not only promotions but also 
the size of rewards. 
9
 The annual number of domestic car sales and the information on market competition during the sample period 
from 2001 to 2008 were obtained from the Automotive Research and Testing Center in Taiwan. This information is 
available on the website: http://www.artc.org.tw/chinese/04_industry/02_detail.aspx?pdid=10andpnid=21 
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selling various models of sedans and trucks, and they have a heterogeneous group of customers. 
For sales of sedans, a customer’s annual salary is the most important factor influencing her 
decision on which model (e.g., economy vs. luxury) to buy. In contrast, customers buying trucks 
are either owners of small businesses who deliver merchandise to their customers or street 
vendors who sell merchandise in night markets. Therefore, functions rather than price are the key 
factors in their decisions on which model to buy. Service branches provide various types of 
services such as car repairs and maintenance. 
Each employee in the sales branches is evaluated by the branch manager twice a year, i.e., in 
May and November. Then, based on the two performance evaluations, the employee receives an 
annual performance rating that is subjectively determined by the branch manager. 10 The ratings 
range from “A” to “E”, with “A” representing excellent performance and “E” representing 
minimum acceptable performance. 11  Because job responsibilities of supervisory and 
nonsupervisory positions differ significantly, I use an indicator variable to specify whether the 
position involves supervising people. In the research company, each job title also corresponds to 
a numeric job level that reflects its hierarchical level in the organization. However, an employee 
working at a higher job level does not necessarily supervise people. For instance, an experienced 
salesperson may work at a higher job level because of her continued service in the company and 
superior performance; however, she does not supervise employees. The HR department of the 
research company provided all job-related information (e.g., annual overall performance rating, 
the number of cars sold, etc.) as well as personal information (e.g., age) for each employee.  
 
 
                                                          
10
 The evaluation period in the research company is from November to October next year. 
11
 The annual overall performance ratings are provided to employees right after the evaluation is conducted in 
November. 
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3.2. Data and sample selection 
I restrict my analysis to employees in the sales branches because objective performance 
measures (i.e., the number of cars sold) are only available in these branches. I do not include 
branch managers, given that objective performance measures for evaluating their overall 
performance may be different (e.g., operating income of the branch). I do not include employees 
working in administration and support services either, because a clear objective performance 
measure is missing for these employees. Due to the availability of the overall performance 
ratings, the sample period covers the years from 2001 to 2008. I begin the sample construction 
by including employee-years for which overall performance ratings and objective performance 
measures are available. Because the number of cars sold is provided monthly, I sum twelve 
months together to measure each employee’s annual objective performance. Employee-years 
with abnormal observations (e.g., less than five-month observations) are excluded.12 This reduces 
the sample size from 7,070 to 6,697 observations. Then I merge this dataset with the promotion 
record of each employee.  
I further exclude employee-years from the final sample if any of the control variables (e.g., 
job tenure and age) that may affect performance evaluations and promotions is missing, resulting 
in a final sample size of 6,079 observations. To cope with potential influence of outliers, I 
winsorize all continuous variables at the top and bottom 1 percent level.13  
3.3. Variable definitions 
3.3.1. Overall performance ratings and objective performance measures 
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 Normally, each employee should have twelve observations each year. Employee-years with less than five 
observations are deemed as outliers, because it is difficult to determine if the small number of observations is due to 
missing data or late employment in a year. 
13
 Variables that are winsorized at the top and bottom 1 percent level include objective performance measures (OBJ), 
branch size (SIZE), tenure (TENURE), and age (AGE). Overall performance rating (RATING) is a categorical 
variable and is not winsorized.  
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The overall performance rating (RATING) is provided for each employee i at the end of year t. 
As discussed above, the rating is based on a five-point rating scale ranging from A to E. In the 
regression model, I convert these alphabetical letters to numerical numbers from one to five, with 
“5” indicating excellent performance and “1” indicating minimum acceptable performance. 
Objective performance measure (OBJ), on the other hand, is the annual number of cars sold by 
an employee each year. According to the research company, this is the major and most important 
objective performance measure considered in the performance-appraisal process. If an employee 
is hired in the middle of the year (e.g., after March 1), I estimate annual objective performance in 
proportion to the number of months she works in that year. 
3.3.2. Job position 
Job position (POS) is defined as whether or not the position is related to a supervisory 
position. Employees in nonsupervisory positions are only responsible for selling cars. On the 
other hand, employees in supervisory positions are not only responsible for selling cars, but are 
also required to work on customer satisfaction, execution, teamwork, innovation, leadership, and 
team coordination. Hence, the differences in job responsibilities between the two positions are 
distinct. The variable equals one if an employee’s work involves supervising people and zero 
otherwise. If an employee changes her job late in the year, her performance evaluation is likely 
to be based on the performance in her previous position. Following Grabner and Moers (2013), I 
use the job position prior to the change as her current year’s job position if an employee changes 
her job in the fourth quarter of the evaluation period. 
3.3.3. Promotion 
Promotion (PROMO) is defined as job changes that represent career advancement in the 
research company’s internal job system. The HR department provides the promotion record. 
16 
 
PROMO equals one if a promotion occurs in the employee-year, and zero otherwise. Similar to 
job position (POS), if a promotion occurs in July or later in the year, the promotion is more 
likely to be based on performance in the current year instead of last year.
14
 Hence, late 
promotion is recognized in the following year, consistent with Grabner and Moers (2013). Over 
the sample period, there are a total of 740 promotions, and they represent around 17 percent of 
total employee-year observations. 
3.3.4. Control variables 
To parse out potential confounding effects, I include a number of control variables in the 
regression. Job tenure (TENURE) is the length of an employee in the current job title at the end 
of year t (Gibbs 1995; Campbell 2008). I also control for size (SIZE) of each sales branch j, 
because size captures various factors affecting performance evaluations and promotions (Grabner 
and Moers 2013). I measure SIZE as the annual total sales of each sales branch.
15
 Cichello et al. 
(2009) indicate the potential influence of age (AGE) on job changes. Because age may influence 
employees’ incentives for effort provision, AGE is included and is an employee’s age at the end 
of year t. Lastly, I include year indicator (YEAR) to control for a potential year effect and 
standard errors being clustered at the employee level. 
3.4. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1, Panel A provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in the study. The mean 
(median) individual performance rating (RATING) is 3.048 (3.000), consistent with the fact that 
the research company mandates a forced distribution of employee performance ratings by 
requiring that 50 percent of the employees receive a performance rating of “C” (RATING = 3) in 
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 This information is provided during an interview with the HR manager of the car dealership. 
15
 Another measure of SIZE could be the number of employees in each sales branch. However, the research company 
was not able to provide such information. 
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each branch.16 The mean (median) number of cars sold (OBJ) is 44.726 (41.000), suggesting an 
average of 3.7 cars sold each month. The standard deviation of the number of cars sold is 22.771, 
indicating a significant gap between high performers and low performers. Furthermore, the mean 
value of job position (POS) is 0.118, suggesting that only 11.8 percent of the observations are in 
supervisory positions or the great majority of the employees are in nonsupervisory positions. The 
mean (median) value of job tenure (TENURE) is 2.152 (1.000), and most of the employees do 
not stay in the same job title for more than three years (e.g., p75 = 3). Lastly, the mean value of 
employee age (AGE) is 36.193. 
Panel B of Table 1 presents Pearson correlations of the variables. Employees’ overall 
performance ratings (RATING) are positively correlated with objective performance measures 
(OBJ), consistent with Ittner et al. (2003). In addition, the correlations between overall 
performance ratings (RATING) and job tenure (TENURE), branch size (SIZE), and employee age 
(AGE) are also significant. This highlights the importance of including these variables in the 
regression equations. Furthermore, both overall performance ratings (RATING) and objective 
performance measures (OBJ) are positively correlated with the likelihood of being promoted 
(PROMO). The correlation between job tenure (TENURE) and promotion (PROMO) is negative 
and significant, suggesting that employees who stay in their current job titles for a long time are 
more likely to be those with low ability who are passed over for promotions.  
4. Test design and results 
4.1. Overall performance ratings and objective performance measures 
To test H1, I examine whether the association between overall performance ratings and 
objective performance measures is lower for employees holding supervisory positions. In the 
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 A detailed breakdown of the distribution of employee performance ratings is as follows: “A” (10 percent), “B” (15 
percent), “C” (50 percent), “D” (15 percent), and “E” (10 percent). 
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empirical regression model, I also control for other factors that could potentially affect individual 
performance ratings as identified in prior literature (Gibbs 1995; Campbell 2008; Grabner and 
Moers 2013). Because the overall performance ratings are ordinal variables and the real distance 
between categories is unknown, I estimate an ordinal logistic regression for each employee i at 
the end of year t as follows. A negative coefficient on OBJ*POS is consistent with my 
hypothesis that the association between overall performance ratings and objective performance 
measures is lower for employees in supervisory positions.  
 
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Table 2 presents the results. Because the data violates the assumption of proportional odds, 
which suggests that the relationship between each pair of outcome groups is not the same, I 
estimate a generalized ordinal logistic regression and report four sets of coefficient estimates 
based on different sets of comparison (Liu and Koirala 2012).17 Panel A, Table 2 shows that the 
interaction term between OBJ and POS is negative and significant across different cut points 
(coeff. = -0.120, p < 0.01; coeff. = -0.096, p < 0.01; coeff. = -0.068, p < 0.01; coeff. = -0.059, p < 
0.01, respectively). These findings are consistent with H1 that the association between overall 
performance ratings and objective performance measures is weakened when an employee holds a 
supervisory position. To evaluate the economic significance, Panel B presents the results in 
terms of odds ratios (OR). Holding other factors constant, when the employees work in 
supervisory positions, the probabilities of receiving above a particular performance rating 
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 One of the assumptions under ordinal logistic regression is that the relationship between each pair of outcome 
groups is the same. That is, the coefficients that describe the relationship between the lowest versus all higher 
categories of the response variables are the same as those that describe the relationship between the next lowest 
category and all higher categories, etc.  Because the relationship between all pairs of groups is the same, there is 
only one set of coefficients. If the assumption is violated, we will need different sets of coefficients to describe the 
relationship between each pair of outcome groups. (http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/dae/ologit.htm) 
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(RATING) as a result of one standard deviation increase in the objective performance measures 
(OBJ) is reduced by 35.8 percent with RATING > 1, 34.5 percent with RATING > 2, 27.8 percent 
with RATING > 3, and 26.6 percent with RATING > 4.18  
Table 2 also shows that overall performance ratings (RATING) are positively associated with 
objective performance measures (OBJ). The findings are consistent with the evidence that 
objective performance measures are an important determinant of overall performance (Ittner et al. 
2003). In terms of job tenure (TENURE), on-the-job human capital accumulation may increase 
with job tenure, which suggests a positive association between job tenure and overall 
performance ratings. On the other hand, if an employee stays in the current job title for years but 
is not promoted, this may be an indicator of low performance (Gibbs 1995). 19  Hence, the 
likelihood of receiving higher performance ratings is lower. While I do not make directional 
predictions for job tenure (TENURE), my results are consistent with the evidence that employees 
who stay in positions for a long time may be lower performers, and thus the likelihood of 
receiving higher performance ratings is reduced. In addition, job position (POS) is also positively 
associated with overall performance ratings (RATING), which may reflect the fact that 
employees in supervisory positions perform better than those in nonsupervisory positions. The 
coefficients on SIZE are negative, while the coefficients on AGE are no longer significant. 
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 The economic significance is calculated by contrasting the probabilities of receiving above a particular 
performance rating for employees holding different positions. The probabilities are calculated by 
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For example, in column (4), one standard deviation increase in OBJ increases the probability of receiving a rating 
greater than 4 by 83.4 percent ( 771.22*071.0
771.22*071.0
1 e
e

) for employees in nonsupervisory positions. As for 
employees in supervisory positions, the probability is reduced to 56.8 percent given the same increase in OBJ 
( 771.22)*059.0071.0(
771.22)*059.0071.0(
1 

 e
e ). The difference is 26.6 percent. 
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 Gibbs (1995) suggests a nonlinear relationship between job tenure and the likelihood of promotion. That is, 
promotion rates are lowest in the first year at the level, but peak in the second year and decline thereafter. 
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4.2. Subjectivity in promotion decisions 
H2 predicts that, for employees in supervisory positions, the association between subjective 
evaluations and promotion decisions is higher while the association between objective 
performance measures and promotion decisions is lower. To test my second hypothesis, I include 
subjective evaluations (SUB), objective performance measures (OBJ), job position (POS), and 
other control variables same as in Eq. (1) in the logistic regression model as follows:  
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Subjective evaluations (SUB) are measured by subtracting the predicted overall performance 
ratings in Eq. (1) from actual overall performance ratings for each employee i at the end of year 
t.
20
 Because the number of cars sold is the only objective performance measure used in the 
performance-appraisal process, variations in current performance ratings that are not explained 
by variations in the number of cars sold and other control variables should be a reasonable proxy 
of subjective evaluations by supervisors (Hayes and Schaefer 2000).21  In this regard, subjective 
evaluations may contain a supervisor’s subjective assessment of her subordinate’s performance, 
evaluation bias, or perception of the subordinate’s ability. However, in this study, I do not intend 
to separate different components of subjective evaluations. Instead, I focus on whether the use of 
subjective evaluations varies across job positions, even though it is subject to limitations and 
biases as discussed above. A positive coefficient on SUB*POS and a negative coefficient on 
OBJ*POS are consistent with my predictions.  
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 To estimate the predicted overall performance rating, I estimate the probability of receiving different ratings for 
each employee-year observation given the employee’s objective performance measure and other control variables, 
and then pick the rating based on the highest probability.  
21
 An alternative way to measure subjective evaluations is to include RATING directly in the equation and control 
for OBJ and other control variable. The findings are robust with the alternative measure.  
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Table 3, Panel A presents the regression results. The coefficients on SUB*POS are positive 
and significant (coeff. = 1.149, p < 0.01; coeff. = 1.572, p < 0.01), suggesting that the association 
between subjective evaluations and promotion decisions is stronger for employees holding 
supervisory positions. In terms of the coefficients on OBJ*POS, they are negative and significant 
(coeff. = -0.040, p < 0.01; coeff. = -0.054, p < 0.01), suggesting a weaker association between 
objective performance measures and promotion decisions for employees in supervisory positions. 
In column 2 of Panel B, for instance, holding other factors constant, the inference is that when an 
employee works in a supervisory position, the effect of subjective evaluations on the probability 
of receiving a promotion increases by 26 percent. On the other hand, the effect of objective 
performance measures on the probability of receiving a promotion reduces by 1.4 percent for 
employees in supervisory positions. Taken together, the evidence is consistent with H2 that 
promotions rely more (less) on subjective evaluations (objective performance measures) for 
employees holding supervisory positions.  
Not surprisingly, the coefficients on both OBJ and SUB are positive and significant, 
documenting that both objective and subjective measures are important in making promotion 
decisions (Campbell 2008). The coefficients on POS are positive and significant, suggesting that 
employees in supervisory positions are more likely to receive promotions. In the car dealership, 
lower-level employees are found in both supervisory and nonsupervisory positions. Therefore, 
the positions available for another promotion may not reduce significantly, and the likelihood of 
promotions is higher if these promoted employees continue to perform well. The coefficient on 
AGE is negative and significant, suggesting that older employees are less likely to be promoted. 
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This finding is consistent with the evidence that implicit incentives from career concerns are 
weakest when employees are older and closer to retirement (Gibbons and Murphy 1992).22 
4.3. Promotion decisions and future performance 
To test H3, I examine whether employees who are promoted receive higher overall 
performance ratings in the future. In the regression model, I include a dummy variable (PROMO) 
and the same set of control variables as in Eq. (1). In addition, I replace the dependent variable 
with one-year leading overall performance ratings (RATINGt+1). For employees who do not get 
promoted, RATINGt+1 refers to the next year’s performance in the current job. For employees 
who do receive promotions, RATINGt+1 relates to the next year’s performance in the new 
position. A positive coefficient on PROMO is consistent with my hypothesis that employees who 
are promoted this year are more likely to receive higher overall performance ratings in the future. 
The ordinal logistic regression model is estimated as follows: 
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Panel A of Table 4 presents the results of the generalized ordinal logistic regression. The 
coefficients on PROMO are positive and significant across different cut points (coeff. = 0.518, p 
< 0.01).
23
 The findings are consistent with H3, suggesting that promotion decisions not only 
reward past performance but also reflect supervisors’ expectations of their subordinate’s future 
performance after promotion. Hence, an employee who is promoted in the current period tends to 
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 Career concerns occur whenever the internal or external labor market uses a worker’s current output to update its 
belief about the worker’s ability and then bases future wages on this updated belief. Career concerns are strongest 
when a worker is further from retirement because a longer-perspective career increases the return for changing the 
market’s belief (Gibbons and Murphy 1992). 
23
 There is only one set of coefficient estimates on PROMO across different cut points, because the variable does not 
violate the proportional odds (PO) assumption. Other variables, such as POS, violate the PO assumption and thus 
different sets of coefficient estimates are reported. 
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perform well and receive higher overall performance ratings in the future.24 In column (4) of 
Panel B, for instance, holding other factors constant, the inference is that when an employee is 
promoted in the current period, the probability of receiving above a particular performance rating 
(RATING) in the next period increase by 62 percent. 
The sign and significance of control variables are generally consistent with those in Table 2. 
One exception is job position (POS). While job position is positively associated with current 
overall performance, the coefficients on POS are negative and significant in some conditions 
when a dummy variable of promotion is included. As indicated in the correlation matrix (Panel B 
of Table 1), job position (POS) is positively correlated with the likelihood of being promoted 
(PROMO). Hence, it is likely that the positive association between job position and overall 
performance ratings in Eq. (1) is mainly driven by the supervisory employees who are promoted.  
4.4. Additional analyses 
4.4.1. Alternative definition of promotion decisions 
In the main analysis, I define promotions by job changes that represent career advancement 
in the research company, as indicated by the HR department. In the additional analysis, I further 
separate promotions by whether there is a change in job responsibilities upon promotion. As 
discussed earlier, Grabner and Moers (2013) focus on promotion paths of non-management 
employees, and argue that the weight on current job performance decreases while the weight on 
assessed ability increases when there is a greater change in the nature of tasks upon promotion. 
In my study, I have employees in both supervisory and nonsupervisory positions. Hence, I 
examine the relative weights of objective performance measures and subjective evaluations when 
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 I also examine current year’s performance right after a promotion is received, by regression RATINGi,t on 
PROMOi,t. The results are qualitatively similar. In addition, I examine whether promotions predict future 
performance beyond next year by regressing RATINGi,t+2 on PROMOi,t, my findings remain robust. Lastly, to 
address the concern of supervisor favoritism, I replace the dependent variable with the number of cars sold because 
this measure does not involve subjective discretion by the supervisors. The results remain robust. 
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promotions are (1) within nonsupervisory positions, (2) from nonsupervisory positions to 
supervisory positions, or (3) within supervisory positions. In particular, I compare promotions 
from nonsupervisory positions to supervisory positions with the other two types of promotions.  
I estimate the following logistic regression model for different types of promotions, and the 
main interest is on the coefficients on SUB and OBJ across different types of promotions. 
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(4)  
Table 5, Panel A presents the logistic regression results. The coefficients on both SUB and 
OBJ are positive and significant across different types of promotions (SUB: coeff. = 0.562, p < 
0.01; coeff. = 0601, p < 0.01; coeff. = 1.652, p < 0.01, respectively; OBJ: coeff. = 0.062, p < 
0.01; coeff. = 0.050, p < 0.01; coeff. = 0.023, p < 0.01, respectively). The findings suggest that 
both subjective evaluations and objective performance measures are important in all types of 
promotions. In column (2), consistent with Grabner and Moers (2013), the coefficient on SUB is 
higher than that in column (1), indicating that subjective evaluations are more important when 
the promotions involve changes in job responsibilities (i.e., from nonsupervisory to supervisory 
positions). Furthermore, as shown in column (3), the coefficient on SUB is the highest among the 
three types of promotions. The findings suggest that subjective evaluations are most important 
when an employee is promoted from one supervisory position to another supervisory position, 
even though this promotion does not involve significant changes in job requirements. To test 
whether the coefficients on subjective evaluations are different between the three types of 
promotions, I also run an alternative model by combining the whole sample in one ordinal 
logistic regression model. The untabulated results corroborate my findings.   
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Perhaps more interesting, Panel C of Table 5 presents the findings based on the standardized 
coefficients. Focusing on promotions from nonsupervisory positions to supervisory positions (i.e., 
column (2)), while the importance of subjective evaluations has increased, this importance does 
not outweigh the importance of objective performance measures (i.e., SUB: coeff. = 0.509, p < 
0.01; OBJ: coeff. = 1.054, p < 0.01). Moreover, subjective evaluations are more important than 
objective performance measures only for promotions within supervisory positions, as indicated 
in column (3) (i.e., SUB: coeff. = 1.407, p <0.01; OBJ: coeff. = 0.462, p <0.01). A test of 
difference suggests that the coefficients on SUB and OBJ are statistically different in all three 
types of promotion scenarios.  
4.4.2. Promotion-based incentives and employee behavior 
As suggested in H2, promotions provide incentives by rewarding past performance for 
employees in different positions. In this case, are the implicit, promotion-based incentives 
effective? In other words, do employees believe in how they are evaluated under the 
performance evaluation system and adjust their behaviors accordingly?  
The incentives generated by promotions depend on the probability of promotions (Baker et al. 
1988). For example, Campbell (2008) finds that managers in locations where there is a higher ex 
ante probability of promotion demonstrate significant performance improvement in service 
quality, which is an important determinant in their promotion decisions. Based on the assumption 
that promotion-based incentives are stronger when the probability of promotions is high, if 
employees believe in the performance evaluation system, they are more likely to exert effort on 
the job demands, which will increase their chance of being promoted. As discussed in H2, for 
employees in supervisory positions, I expect their promotion decisions to be influenced more by 
subjective evaluations and less by objective performance measures. Therefore, if the promotion-
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based incentives are effective, when promotion opportunities are high, employees in supervisory 
positions are more likely to perform better on subjective evaluations but perform worse on 
objective performance measures. 
To estimate promotion opportunities (PROMO_OPP), I follow Campbell (2008) and 
measure PROMO_OPP as each employee’s ex ante assessment of her own probability of being 
promoted. Because there are six different job levels, promotion opportunities are measured as the 
ratio of the number of positions available at the next higher job level to the current job level in 
branch j. Hence, the incentives generated by promotion opportunities are higher when (1) the 
likelihood of the next job level becoming available is high, or (2) the number of other employees 
at the same job level to compete for promotions is relatively low. I include PROMO_OPP in the 
two regression models below, and the variable of interest is the interaction term between POS 
and PROMO_OPP. 
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Table 6, Panel A reports the findings in Eq. (5a). The coefficients on POS*PROMO_OPP are 
positive and significant (coeff. = 1.085, p < 0.01; coeff. = 1.117, p < 0.01; coeff. = 1.098, p < 
0.01, coeff. = 1.098, p < 0.01, respectively). This finding indicates that, when promotion 
opportunities are high, employees in supervisory positions perform better on subjective 
evaluations. In addition, the coefficients on PROMO_OPP are negative and significant. The 
coefficients present the effect of promotion opportunities on subjective evaluations when 
employees work in nonsupervisory positions (i.e., POS = 0). The finding suggests that these 
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employees tend to perform worse on subjective evaluations when promotion opportunities are 
high, probably due to the fact that their performance is determined mainly by objective 
performance measures rather than subjective evaluations. 
Panel B of Table 6 presents the findings in Eq. (5b). While the coefficient on 
POS*PROMO_OPP is negative, it is not statistically significant (i.e., column (4)). The findings 
are likely to be driven by the fact that objective performance measures are important in 
determining annual bonus. Hence, employees in supervisory positions do not neglect the 
importance of objective performance when promotion opportunities are high. Overall, the 
evidence is consistent with H2, and it suggests that the implicit, promotion-based incentives are 
effective by making employees focus on different performance measures when the probability of 
being promoted is high.25     
4.4.3. Alternative measure of job position 
As mentioned before, the research company also assigns a job level, on a scale from one to 
six, to each employee. The untabulated analysis shows that job positions defined by supervisory 
and nonsupervisory positions are positively correlated with job levels defined by discrete 
numbers (0.38. p < 0.01). It suggests that differences in job responsibilities might be defined by a 
variable from one to six, with higher job levels requesting more non-quantifiable skills. 
Therefore, I rerun the regressions by using the discrete variables (LEVEL).  
As shown in Table 7, the results are qualitatively similar but weaker when measuring 
differences in job responsibilities by job levels. One possible explanation is that using job levels 
adds noise in the measure of differences in job responsibilities. As discussed above, an employee 
may work at a higher job level because of her continued service and superior performance. In 
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 I also run the analysis by separating employees into two subsamples, supervisory and nonsupervisory employees. 
Then I examine the association between PROMO_OPP and SUB for supervisory employees as well as the 
association between PROMO_OPP and OBJ for nonsupervisory employees. The results are qualitatively similar. 
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this case, her job responsibility does not change significantly when she works at a higher job 
level. Overall, the evidence is consistent with the main analyses.26 
5. Conclusion 
In this study, I investigate whether the use of subjectivity in performance evaluation and 
incentive design depends on the requirement of job responsibilities. I find the association 
between overall performance ratings and objective performance measures to be lower for 
employees holding supervisory positions, consistent with the signaling perspective of 
performance measurement that objective performance measures are less informative for 
employees in supervisory positions. In addition, the choice of performance measures in 
promotion decisions also varies. For employees holding supervisory positions, promotions 
depend more on subjective evaluations and less on objective performance measures, consistent 
with the incentive provision function of promotions. Lastly, employees who are promoted in the 
current period tend to receive higher overall performance ratings in the future. Taken together, 
the evidence suggests that promotion decisions, which are a function of different performance 
measures in the current positions, not only reward an employee’s past performance but also 
reflect her supervisor’s expectation about her future performance.  
My study has implications for the design of management control systems. The importance of 
a performance measure in overall performance evaluation might be related to its informativeness 
in capturing an employee’s job demands. That is, when a supervisor evaluates her subordinate’s 
performance based on the expectation of the subordinate’s job responsibilities, greater weight 
should be placed on the performance measures that are more informative about the subordinate’s 
overall performance.  
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 In Panel B of Table 7, the coefficients on SUB*LEVEL are insignificant. Because there are six job levels, resulting 
in very few observations in some cells, the analysis suggests that the data is spread too thin, which may cause biased 
estimates of the coefficients. 
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Second, my findings are also relevant to the design of implicit, promotion-based incentives. 
For an optimal design of promotion-based incentives, promotions should be related to 
performance measures that are more informative about an employee’s overall performance. This 
would ensure that employees exert effort on the job demands that are more important in their 
positions. In addition, promotions should also take into account the expected future performance 
of an employee. My findings show that, on average, subjective evaluations are associated with 
promotion decisions regardless of the position an employee holds (Table 3).27 This finding could 
suggest that, when making promotion decisions, supervisors include subjective discretions that 
may reflect the expectations of their subordinates’ ability to succeed in the new job.    
Lastly, as suggested in prior literature, an optimal compensation contract should optimize 
total incentives by taking into account both explicit, compensation-based incentives and implicit, 
promotion-based incentives (Ederhof 2011). In the additional analysis, I find that promotion-
based incentives are effective because employees exert effort on different performance measures 
when promotion opportunities are high. To ensure an effective overall compensation design, 
firms should think carefully about how to balance different incentives (i.e., explicit vs. implicit 
incentives), such as the design of compensation contracts for employees who face lower 
promotion opportunities or weaker career concerns. 
This study uses a proprietary dataset in Taiwan. While there might be differences between 
Western and Asian cultures, the performance-appraisal process in the research company is not 
different from the practices in U.S. firms.28 Hence, the findings of this study have implications 
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 As shown in Panel A of Table 3, the coefficients on SUB are positive and significant (coeff. = 0.507, p < 0.01; 
coeff. = 0.539, p < 0.01). The findings document that, on average, promotion decisions are influenced by subjective 
evaluations even when the employees are in nonsupervisory positions (i.e., POS = 0). 
28
 Merchant et al. (1995) examine differences between U.S. and Taiwanese firms in measuring, evaluating, and 
rewarding profit center managers. Their findings suggest that the extent of using subjective evaluations in the 
performance appraisal process is similar between the two countries. For example, one of their U.S. firms uses 
subjective overall ratings on a five-point scale, same as the practice of the research company in my study.  
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for studies in the United States. However, the findings should be interpreted with the following 
caveats in mind. First, while the findings of this study suggest that subjective evaluations might 
be more informative about the non-quantifiable aspects of job responsibilities, it is also important 
to recognize that subjective evaluations are subject to evaluation biases, as mentioned earlier in 
the paper. The dataset from the car dealership does not allow me to disentangle evaluation biases 
from subjective assessments of the employees’ performance, and future research could address 
the issue with different research settings. Second, similar to other field research, this is a one-
company study. The extent to which the results of this study can be generalized to other 
industries or companies is unclear. Despite the limitations, the findings of this study advance our 
knowledge about how subjectivity is used in performance evaluation and incentive design across 
job levels for lower-level employees. 
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Appendix A: Variable definitions 
Variable Description 
RATING Overall annual performance rating of each employee i at the end of year t. 
OBJ Annual number of cars sold. 
SUB Actual overall performance rating minus predicted overall performance rating 
estimated in Eq. (1). 
POS A dummy variable defined as whether the position is related to a supervisory 
position. It equal one if the position is a supervisory position, and zero 
otherwise. 
TENURE The length of an employee in the current job title. 
SIZE Total sales of each sales branch in New Taiwan Dollar (NTD), scaled by 
1,000,000. 
AGE Each employee’s age at the end of year t. 
PROMO A dummy variable defined as job changes representing career advancement 
in the car dealership. It equals one when a promotion occurs for the 
employee-year, and zero otherwise. 
PROMO_OPP The ratio of positions available at the next higher job level to the current job 
level in each branch j. 
LEVEL Job levels, on a discrete scale from one to six.   
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
Variables N Mean Q1 Median Q3 Std. dev 
       
RATING 6,079 3.048 2.000 3.000 4.000 1.070 
OBJ 6,079 44.726 31.000 41.000 55.000 22.771 
SUB 6,079 0.038 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.880 
POS 6,079 0.118 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.323 
TENURE 6,079 2.152 0.000 1.000 3.000 2.532 
SIZE 6,079 3.196 2.182 2.973 3.807 1.682 
AGE 6,079 36.193 31.000 36.000 41.000 6.624 
PROMO 4,360 0.170 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.375 
 
Panel B: Correlation matrix 
The table provides Pearson correlation coefficients for the primary variables in this study. A correlation 
coefficient in bold indicates that the correlation is statistically significant at 5 percent level.  
 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(1) RATING 
       (2) OBJ 0.540 
(3) SUB 0.687 -0.041      
(4) POS -0.009 -0.011 0.012     
(5) TENURE -0.063 -0.102 -0.047 -0.099    
(6) SIZE 0.028 0.262 -0.007 -0.001 -0.050   
(7) AGE 0.106 0.094 -0.028 0.187 0.190 -0.070  
(8) PROMO 0.398 0.371 0.140 0.056 -0.104 0.020 -0.009 
The sample is from 2001 to 2008. RATING is the overall annual performance rating of each employee. 
OBJ is the annual number of cars sold. SUB is the actual overall performance rating minus predicted 
overall performance rating. POS is a dummy variable defined as whether the position is related to a 
supervisory position. TENURE is the length of an employee in the current job position. SIZE is the total 
sales of each sales branch in New Taiwan Dollar (NTD), scaled by 1,000,000. AGE is each employee’s 
age at the end of year t. PROMO is a dummy variable equal to one when a promotion occurs for the 
employee-year. All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1 percent level. 
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Table 2: Association between overall performance ratings and objective performance measures (H1) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  RATING > 1 RATING > 2 RATING > 3 RATING > 4 
  vs. vs. vs. vs. 
 Pred. RATING ≤ 1 RATING ≤ 2 RATING ≤ 3 RATING ≤ 4 
Panel A: Coefficient 
estimates 
     
OBJ + 0.138*** 0.110*** 0.085*** 0.071*** 
  [16.692] [20.314] [13.279] [14.348] 
POS ? 3.399*** 3.494*** 3.070*** 3.075*** 
  [8.300] [12.930] [9.537] [8.812] 
OBJ*POS − -0.120*** -0.096*** -0.068*** -0.059*** 
  [-10.539] [-15.103] [-10.041] [-9.671] 
TENURE ? 0.020 -0.016 -0.051** -0.098*** 
  [0.678] [-1.000] [-2.471] [-3.203] 
SIZE ? -0.099** -0.105*** -0.179*** -0.231*** 
  [-2.111] [-3.559] [-3.416] [-3.473] 
AGE ? 0.008 0.006 0.001 -0.008 
  [0.810] [0.906] [0.162] [-0.823] 
Constant ? -0.772 -4.507*** -5.332*** -5.676*** 
  [-1.456] [-12.126] [-9.620] [-9.759] 
Panel B: Odds ratio estimates      
OBJ  1.148*** 1.116*** 1.089*** 1.073*** 
  [16.692] [20.314] [13.279] [14.348] 
POS  29.928*** 32.919*** 21.534*** 21.641*** 
  [8.300] [12.930] [9.537] [8.812] 
OBJ*POS  0.887*** 0.908*** 0.935*** 0.943*** 
  [-10.539] [-15.103] [-10.041] [-9.671] 
TENURE  1.020 0.984 0.950** 0.906*** 
  [0.678] [-1.000] [-2.471] [-3.203] 
SIZE  0.905** 0.901*** 0.836*** 0.794*** 
  [-2.111] [-3.559] [-3.416] [-3.473] 
AGE  1.008 1.006 1.001 0.992 
  [0.810] [0.906] [0.162] [-0.823] 
Constant  0.462 0.011*** 0.005*** 0.003*** 
  [-1.456] [-12.126] [-9.620] [-9.759] 
      
Observations  6,079 
Year FE  YES 
Cluster by employee  YES 
Psudo Rsquare  0.200 
The table presents estimates of generalized ordinal logistic regressions in Eq. (1), in which the dependent 
variable is RATING. Both the dependent and independent variables are based on year t. The sample 
consists of 6,079 employee-year observations during the period of 2001 to 2008. All continuous variables 
are winsorized at the top and bottom 1 percent level. t-statistics are presented in parentheses. *, **, *** 
indicates that the estimates coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent 
levels, respectively. Detailed variable definitions are presented in Appendix A.  
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Table 3: Subjectivity in promotion decisions (H2)  
  (1) (2) 
 Pred. PROMO PROMO 
Panel A: Coefficient estimates    
SUB + 0.507*** 0.539*** 
  [8.427] [7.680] 
OBJ + 0.052*** 0.068*** 
  [21.887] [12.419] 
POS ? 2.099*** 2.863*** 
  [6.088] [6.731] 
SUB*POS + 1.149*** 1.572*** 
  [6.194] [6.695] 
OBJ*POS − -0.040*** -0.054*** 
  [-7.215] [-7.131] 
TENURE ?  -0.052* 
   [-1.645] 
SIZE ?  -0.087* 
   [-1.693] 
AGE ?  -0.033*** 
   [-3.765] 
Constant ? -4.574*** -5.393*** 
  [-29.992] [-8.421] 
Panel B: Odds ratio estimates    
SUB  1.661*** 1.714*** 
  [8.427] [7.680] 
OBJ  1.053*** 1.070*** 
  [21.887] [12.419] 
POS  8.155*** 17.513*** 
  [6.088] [6.731] 
SUB*POS  3.155*** 4.818*** 
  [6.194] [6.695] 
OBJ*POS  0.961*** 0.947*** 
  [-7.215] [-7.131] 
TENURE   0.949* 
   [-1.645] 
SIZE   0.917* 
   [-1.693] 
AGE   0.968*** 
   [-3.765] 
Constant  0.010*** 0.005*** 
  [-29.992] [-8.421] 
    
Observations  4,360 4,360 
Year FE  NO YES 
Cluster by employee  NO YES 
Psudo Rsquare  0.212 0.315 
The table presents estimates of logistic regressions in Eq. (2), in which the dependent variable is PROMO. 
The dependent variable is based on year t+1, while the independent variables are based on year t. The 
sample consists of 4,360 employee-year observations during the period of 2001 to 2007. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1 percent level. t-statistics are presented in parentheses. *, 
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**, *** indicates that the estimates coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 
percent levels, respectively. Detailed variable definitions are presented in Appendix A.  
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Table 4: Promotion decisions and future performance (H3) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  RATING > 1 RATING > 2 RATING > 3 RATING > 4 
  vs. vs. vs. vs. 
 Pred. RATING ≤ 1 RATING ≤ 2 RATING ≤ 3 RATING ≤ 4 
Panel A: Coefficient estimates      
PROMO + 0.518*** 0.518*** 0.518*** 0.518*** 
  [5.835] [5.835] [5.835] [5.835] 
POS ? -0.904*** -0.664*** -0.376*** -0.263 
  [-4.676] [-5.399] [-3.331] [-1.575] 
TENURE ? -0.074*** -0.074*** -0.074*** -0.074*** 
  [-4.367] [-4.367] [-4.367] [-4.367] 
SIZE ? 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 
  [1.010] [1.010] [1.010] [1.010] 
AGE ? 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
  [0.175] [0.175] [0.175] [0.175] 
Constant ? 3.236*** 1.601*** -0.351 -1.799*** 
  [12.703] [6.560] [-1.430] [-7.185] 
Panel B: Odds ratio estimates      
PROMO  1.679*** 1.679*** 1.679*** 1.679*** 
  [5.835] [5.835] [5.835] [5.835] 
POS  0.405*** 0.515*** 0.686*** 0.769 
  [-4.676] [-5.399] [-3.331] [-1.575] 
TENURE  0.929*** 0.929*** 0.929*** 0.929*** 
  [-4.367] [-4.367] [-4.367] [-4.367] 
SIZE  1.022 1.022 1.022 1.022 
  [1.010] [1.010] [1.010] [1.010] 
AGE  1.001 1.001 1.001 1.001 
  [0.175] [0.175] [0.175] [0.175] 
Constant  25.437*** 4.960*** 0.704 0.165*** 
  [12.703] [6.560] [-1.430] [-7.185] 
      
Observations  4,360 
Year FE  YES 
Cluster by employee  YES 
Psudo Rsquare  0.016 
The table presents estimates of generalized ordinal logistic regressions in Eq. (3), in which the dependent 
variable is RATING. The dependent variable is based on year t+1, while the independent variables are 
based on year t. The sample consists of 4,360 employee-year observations during the period of 2001 to 
2007. All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1 percent level. t-statistics are 
presented in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates that the estimates coefficient is statistically significant at the 
10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Detailed variable definitions are presented in 
Appendix A.  
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Table 5: Alternative definition of promotion decisions 
  (1) 
Nonsupervisory 
to  
nonsupervisory 
(2) 
Nonsupervisory 
to  
supervisory 
(3) 
Supervisory 
to  
supervisory 
 Pred. PROMO PROMO  PROMO 
Panel A: Coefficient estimates     
SUB + 0.562*** 0.601*** 1.652*** 
  [8.183] [3.759] [12.187] 
OBJ + 0.062*** 0.050*** 0.023*** 
  [13.366] [11.168] [3.341] 
TENURE ? 0.000 -0.269*** -0.204*** 
  [0.012] [-3.169] [-4.194] 
SIZE ? -0.092* -0.097 0.022 
  [-1.646] [-1.275] [0.293] 
AGE ? -0.057*** 0.013 0.076*** 
  [-5.530] [0.874] [3.742] 
Constant ? -4.165*** -6.883*** -9.621*** 
  [-6.977] [-10.020] [-9.901] 
Panel B: Odds ratio estimates     
SUB  1.753*** 1.824*** 5.216*** 
  [8.183] [3.759] [12.187] 
OBJ  1.063*** 1.052*** 1.023*** 
  [13.366] [11.168] [3.341] 
TENURE  1.000 0.764*** 0.815*** 
  [0.012] [-3.169] [-4.194] 
SIZE  0.912* 0.908 1.022 
  [-1.646] [-1.275] [0.293] 
AGE  0.944*** 1.013 1.079*** 
  [-5.530] [0.874] [3.742] 
Constant  0.016*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 
  [-6.977] [-10.020] [-9.901] 
     
Observations  4,124 3,746 3,729 
Year FE  YES YES YES 
Cluster by employee  YES YES YES 
Psudo Rsquare  0.286 0.242 0.259 
The table presents estimates of logistic regressions in Eq. (4), in which the dependent variable is PROMO. 
The dependent variable is based on year t+1, while the independent variables are based on year t. The 
sample consists of 4,124, 3,746, and 3,729 employee-year observations respectively during the period of 
2001 to 2007. All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1 percent level. t-statistics 
are presented in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates that the estimates coefficient is statistically significant at 
the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Detailed variable definitions are presented in 
Appendix A.  
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Panel C: Standardized coefficients based on all independent variables 
  (1) 
Nonsupervisory 
to  
nonsupervisory 
(2) 
Nonsupervisory 
to  
supervisory 
(3) 
Supervisory 
to  
supervisory 
 Pred. PROMO PROMO  PROMO 
Panel A: Coefficient estimates     
SUB + 0.469*** 0.509*** 1.407*** 
  [8.183] [3.759] [12.187] 
OBJ + 1.324*** 1.054*** 0.462*** 
  [13.366] [11.168] [3.341] 
TENURE ? 0.001 -0.692*** -0.523*** 
  [0.012] [-3.169] [-4.194] 
SIZE ? -0.157* -0.167 0.038 
  [-1.646] [-1.275] [0.293] 
AGE ? -0.367*** 0.080 0.484*** 
  [-5.530] [0.874] [3.742] 
     
Test equality of SUB = OBJ  p < 0.01*** p < 0.01*** p < 0.01*** 
Observations  4,124 3,746 3,729 
Year FE  YES YES YES 
Cluster by employee  YES YES YES 
Psudo Rsquare  0.286 0.242 0.259 
The table presents estimates of logistic regressions in Eq. (4), in which the dependent variable is PROMO. 
The dependent variable is based on year t+1, while the independent variables are based on year t. The 
coefficients are reported with all independent variables being standardized with a mean of 0 and a 
variance of 1. The sample consists of 4,124, 3,746, and 3,729 employee-year observations respectively 
during the period of 2001 to 2007. All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1 
percent level. t-statistics are presented in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates that the estimates coefficient is 
statistically significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Detailed variable 
definitions are presented in Appendix A.  
42 
 
Table 6: Promotion-Based Incentives and Employee Behavior  
Panel A: Promotion opportunities on subjective evaluations 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pred.  SUB SUB SUB SUB 
      
POS ? -0.312*** -0.335*** -0.333*** -0.333*** 
  [-5.589] [-5.920] [-5.881] [-4.010] 
PROMO_OPP ? -0.455*** -0.500*** -0.488*** -0.488*** 
  [-6.899] [-7.465] [-7.228] [-6.188] 
POS*PROMO_OPP + 1.085*** 1.117*** 1.098*** 1.098*** 
  [7.139] [7.354] [7.205] [4.950] 
TENURE ?  -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** 
   [-4.022] [-4.026] [-3.174] 
SIZE ?  0.011 0.006 0.006 
   [1.526] [0.697] [0.476] 
AGE ?  -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
   [-0.460] [-0.171] [-0.132] 
Constant  0.192*** 0.245*** 0.330*** 0.330*** 
  [7.767] [3.387] [4.081] [3.354] 
      
Observations  5,822 5,822 5,822 5,822 
Year FE  NO NO YES YES 
Cluster by employee  NO NO NO YES 
R-squared  0.012 0.015 0.019 0.019 
The table presents estimates OLS regressions in Eq. (5a), in which the dependent variable is SUB. Both 
the dependent and independent variables are based on year t. The sample consists of 5,822 employee-year 
observations respectively during the period of 2001 to 2008. All continuous variables are winsorized at 
the top and bottom 1 percent level. t-statistics are presented in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates that the 
estimates coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, 
respectively. Detailed variable definitions are presented in Appendix A.  
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Panel B: Promotion opportunities on objective performance measures 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pred.  OBJ OBJ OBJ OBJ 
      
POS ? 1.297 -2.199 -0.667 -0.667 
  [0.933] [-1.625] [-0.507] [-0.298] 
PROMO_OPP ? 5.017*** -0.815 2.027 2.027 
  [3.054] [-0.508] [1.293] [0.782] 
POS*PROMO_OPP − -0.867 1.006 -3.310 -3.310 
  [-0.229] [0.277] [-0.935] [-0.521] 
TENURE ?  -1.043*** -0.931*** -0.931*** 
   [-9.430] [-8.657] [-8.094] 
SIZE ?  3.236*** 2.002*** 2.002*** 
   [19.133] [10.632] [4.832] 
AGE ?  0.421*** 0.471*** 0.471*** 
   [9.783] [11.158] [7.867] 
Constant  42.119*** 21.144*** 27.867*** 27.867*** 
  [68.243] [12.222] [14.837] [9.125] 
      
Observations  5,822 5,822 5,822 5,822 
Year FE  NO NO YES YES 
Cluster by employee  NO NO NO YES 
R-squared  0.002 0.082 0.139 0.139 
The table presents estimates OLS regressions in Eq. (5b), in which the dependent variable is OBJ. Both 
the dependent and independent variables are based on year t. The sample consists of 5,822 employee-year 
observations respectively during the period of 2001 to 2008. All continuous variables are winsorized at 
the top and bottom 1 percent level. t-statistics are presented in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates that the 
estimates coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, 
respectively. Detailed variable definitions are presented in Appendix A.  
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Table 7: Alternative measure of job position 
Panel A: The association between overall performance ratings and objective performance measures 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  RATING > 1 RATING > 2 RATING > 3 RATING > 4 
  vs. vs. vs. vs. 
 Pred. RATING ≤ 1 RATING ≤ 2 RATING ≤ 3 RATING ≤ 4 
Panel A: Coefficient estimates      
OBJ*LEVEL − -0.030*** -0.025*** -0.024*** -0.021*** 
  [-10.085] [-15.462] [-14.198] [-9.723] 
      
Observations  6,079 
Year FE  YES 
Control variables  YES 
Cluster by employee  YES 
Psudo Rsquare  0.194 
The table presents estimates of generalized ordinal logistic regressions in Eq. (1), with job position 
defined by the LEVEL. All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1 percent level. t-
statistics are presented in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates that the estimates coefficient is statistically 
significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Detailed variable definitions are 
presented in Appendix A.  
 
Panel B: Subjectivity in promotion decisions 
  (1) (2) 
 Pred. PROMO PROMO 
Panel A: Coefficient estimates    
SUB*LEVEL + -0.052 0.026 
  [-0.767] [0.234] 
OBJ*LEVEL − -0.024*** -0.033*** 
  [-10.056] [-8.465] 
    
Observations  4,360 4,360 
Control variables  NO YES 
Year FE  NO YES 
Cluster by employee  NO YES 
Psudo Rsquare  0.224 0.335 
The table presents estimates of generalized ordinal logistic regressions in Eq. (2), with job position 
defined by the LEVEL. All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1 percent level. t-
statistics are presented in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates that the estimates coefficient is statistically 
significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Detailed variable definitions are 
presented in Appendix A.  
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Panel C: Promotion decisions and future performance 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  RATING > 1 RATING > 2 RATING > 3 RATING > 4 
  vs. vs. vs. vs. 
 Pred. RATING ≤ 1 RATING ≤ 2 RATING ≤ 3 RATING ≤ 4 
Panel A: Coefficient estimates      
PROMO + 0.416 0.208 0.357*** 0.064 
  [1.572] [1.459] [3.441] [0.491] 
      
Observations  4,360 
Control variables  YES 
Year FE  YES 
Cluster by employee  YES 
Psudo Rsquare  0.017 
The table presents estimates of generalized ordinal logistic regressions in Eq. (3), with job position 
defined by the LEVEL. All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1 percent level. t-
statistics are presented in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates that the estimates coefficient is statistically 
significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Detailed variable definitions are 
presented in Appendix A.  
 
